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ABSTRACT
In this paper I provide some evidence on the question of whether the
behavior of unemployed young blacks, whose reservation wages are relatively
high and whose jobless spells are very lengthy, reflect rational maximizing
choices. To do this, I use a simple income—maximizing job search model to
imply employment probabilities and various elasticities which are compared
to those which are actually observed for young blacks.
The results show that, for reasonable discount rates, the employment
probabilities implied by income—maximization are consistent with those
observed for young blacks. The elasticities of reservation wages with
respect to nonwage income that are implied by income—maximizing are also
consistent with those estimated econometrically for this group. This was
true despite the many assumptions embodied in this model whose validity for
a sample of low—income youth is highly questionable.
The evidence thus suggests that young blacks are making economically
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The exceedingly high rates of unemployment which plague black youth today
have generated a great deal of interest and concern among economists and
policy—makers. While recent research has provided sane important insights
into the nature and causes of the problem, many puzzles remain unresolved.
For instance, the evidence seems to indicate that the problem of unemployment
for black youth is primarily one of lengthy duration (or low probability of
gaining employment), rather than one of high frequency (or high probability of
losing employment).1 Furthermore, the reported reservation wages of black
youth remain above the minimum wage despite these lengthy durations of
unemployment; yet they continue to express desires for work and seek jobs
which are comparable to those sought by white youth.2
These findings beg the question of whether black youth are behaving in an
economically rational manner. Do lengthy durations of joblessness reflect
income or utility—maximizing behavior on the part of black youth who
accurately perceive their unattractive labor market opportunities and who
choose their responses accordingly? Or does their behavior reflect some besic
irrationality, caused either by incorrect expectations that fail to adapt
(despite lengthy periods of search) or by tastes, attitudes, etc. that yield
non—maximizing outcomes?
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This paper presents some evidence on these issues. In particular, I
analyze some survey data on job search by Inner—city black youth using a
technique developed recently by Lancaster and Chesher.3 They use a simple
income—maximizing model of job search to derive formulas for the elasticities
of reservation wages and employment probabilities with respect to nonwage
income and job offer arrival rates. These formulas enable us to compute these
elasticities from summary statistics instead of estimating these parameters
statistically. However, the technique is valid only if the stringent
assumptions of the simple job search model are correct (and if certain survey
data can be interpreted in a particular manner).
The validity of these assumptions for a sample of unemployed black youth
are tested below. Using formulas derived by Lancaster and Chesher, I compute
the elasticities and employment probabilities for unemployed blacks that are
implied by the income—maximizing job search model. These are then compared to
observed employment probabilities and econometrically estimated elastics to
test whether the income—maximizing model correctly predicts their behavior.
The computed elasticities are also interesting In their own right as measures
of responsiveness to economic incentives. The model, the data, the results
and various caveats are all described below.
I.. The Model and Data
In their paper, Lancaster and Chesher use an Income—maximizing job search
model to derive an unemployed individual's optimal reservation wage. After
some algebraic manipulations, they then show that the elasticities of this
reservation wage with respect to nonwage income and job offer arrivals
respectively are:3
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where r is the individual's optimal reservation wage; e is the expected
wage, conditional on this reservation wage (defined as e = w
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where f(w) is the distribution of offered wages an individual faces); b Is a
constant stream of nonwage income which the Individual receives while being
unemployed; and X is the rate of job offer arrivals. The elasticities of
employment probabilities withrespectto these same variables were calculated
as:
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here the fraction f(wr)/(1 —F(Wr))is the hazard function for employment.
Allof these calculations depend crucially on the following formula whichwas
àisoderived from equations for the reservation wage and expected wage:
P r
(5)Ew —b
p e r w -w
*here p is the Individual's discount rate.
Lancaster and Chesher then compute these elasticities using summary data
on a sample of unemployed British workers. In addition to providing data on
unemployment insurance payments and reported reservation wages, the survey
which they use also includes questions on how much the individual expects to4
earn on a new job.4 By interpreting this last variable as the individual's
conditional expected wage, Lancaster and Chesher have all the variables
necessary for the calculation of the first two elasticities above;5 and, by
hypothesizing a functional form for the distribution of offered wages (they
use the Pareto discription), they calculate the last two elasticities as
well.6 All elasticities are calculated using sample means of the independent
variables, and all are shown to be comparable to elasticities calculated by
others using more coventional econometric techniques.
The same model can be applied to unemployed black youth in this country
by using the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Suriey of Iowa—City
Black Youth. This survey was conducted in 1979 and 1980 for 2400 males, aged
16 through 24, who live in predominantly black and low—income city blocks of
Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia.7
The survey contains a few questions which are used to gauge respondents'
expected wages and several more which gauge reservation wages; in both cases,
the responses obtained are generally consistent with one another. The ones
used in the calculations below are responses to the questions, "How much per
hour do you think you would earn (on the best job you could get right now)?"
and "If you were offered that job tomorrow, would you take It If it paid
_____?"withresponses to the latter provided at $.50Intervals.8 Respondents
were also asked whether they thought their chances of obtaining these jobs
were "very high," "somewhat high," "somewhat low," or "very low." The vast
majority of responses fell in the middle two categories, which are consistent
with the Lancaster--Chesher interpretation of responses as conditional
expectations of offer wage distributions.S
Nonwage income sources and amounts for these youth in the previous four
weeks were also gauged in the survey. Since most of the unemployed youth here
have had either very short employment durations or no recent work experience,
the fraction who report receiving Unemployment Insurance is very low.9
Instead, most report gifts or loans from friends and relatives, other transfer
payments, and illegal activities as their main sources of income. Though the
last category undoubtedly contains a good deal of reporting error, these
responses probably provide the most realistic accounts of nonwage income
sources for these youth that could have been obtained)°
Finally, the NBER survey contains a retrospective time—line for the
previous year that records all periods of employment during that period.
Employment and unemployment durations as well as transition probabilities
between employment states have been calculated using these data.11 These
estimates of employment probabilities for the unemployed are used below for
comparison purposes with measures implied by the Lancaster—Chesher model.
Before presenting the results below, a few caveats are in order. As they
themselves acknowledge, the model of Lancaster and Chesher is a simple one
which assumes income (as opposed to utility) maximization, constant
reservation wages, and rational expectations with regards to potential wage
offers in the market. These are strong assumptions for any sample, and are
even less likely to hold for a sample of low—wage youth whose experience In
and knowledge of the labor market are limited. Furthermore, as young people
who are mostly unmarried and living at home, their tastes for leisure or other
non—market uses of time may make the assumptions of strict income—maximization
untenable. Perhaps most Importantly, these youth generally do not have access
to a constant stream of nonwage income that can be considered exogenously
determined (such as Unemployment Insurance); their income sources (especially6
illegal ones) are much more likely to reflect endogenous choices which are
influenced by status, risk and other non—pecuniary considerations outside of
the model. Thus we would expect the Lancaster—Chesher model to be less well—
suited to these youth than to a sample which is more broadly representative of
the population.
Despite these drawbacks, the job search model provides a useful benchmark
for judging the consistency of behavior by low—income youth with simple
maximizing principles. Once this benchmark is established, we can consider
the effects of various biases Induced by complicating factors and also by
potential measurement errors in the variables used. Thus, the results
reported below should provide some important insights despite the strong
assumptions of the model on which they are based.
II. Results and Their Implications
Table 1 below presents means and standard deviations on the variables
which are used in the calculations for those in the NBER. survey.12 The sample
includes all those without work who are not students)-3
The results show reservation wages which are above the minimum wage
(which was $2.90 in 1979 and 3.10 in 1980) despite the low monthly probability
of gaining employment. In fact, the latter figure implies that expected
durations of completed spells without employment are approximately a year
Iong.4
The expected wage is well above the reservation wage at the mean;
frequencies show this to be true for most Individuals as well. The evidence
is thus consistent with the Lancaster—Chesher interpretation of this variable
as a mean of the wage offer distribution, conditional on offers being above
the reservation wage. In fact, the expected wagemeasure is also well aboveTable 1
Relevant Characteristics of
Black Youth in NBER Survey









Note: Sample includes all individuals without work who are not enrolled in
school.7
the mean of previously received wages for this group; this suggests some
possibility that black youth are overly optimistic about their prospects in
the labor market, though the evidence is certainly not conclusive.15
As for the nonwage income figure, the large standard deviation reflects a
great deal of variation in individuals' outside income sources. A major
source of this variation involves illegal activities, which are reported by
approximately 19% of the sample)6 Since evidence on self—reported crime
rates generally shows them to be underreported, there is some reason to
believe that this income figure is downward—biased.17 This, in turn, Implies
that substantial sources of income may be available to the young unemployed——
especially relative to income needs for the vast majority who continue to lIve
athome.
Table 2 then shows the employment probabilities and elasticities that are
implied by these data when using the formulas derived from the simple job
search model. Perhaps most important for a test of the model's validity for
this sample is the first line, which reports the employment probability
(divided by discount rate) implied by the model. In comparing this figure
with the observed monthly probability reported in the previous table, we find
that the probability Jnplied by income—maximizing behavior equals the observed
one if the annual discount rate of individuals in the sample is approximately
41%.
Of course, we have no wayofknowing what the true discount rate really
Is. While economists generally assume it to be a number much lower than this,
it is not inconceivable that the true discount rate among youth from low—
Income backgrounds is as high as (or even higher than) the 41% mark. It is
therefore quite possible that, given their nonwage income sources and wageTable 2
Implied Employment Probabilities
and Elasticities Using Simple
Job Search Model
Employment Probability/Discount Rate 2.388








Note: Calculation of elasticities for employment probabilities assumes Pareto
distribution of offered wages.8
opportunities in the labor market, the high reservation wages and lengthy
durations of joblessness which we observe for black youth are income—
maximizing choices.
It is also interesting to note the direction of the error in the implied
probability if the true discount rate is different from 41%. For a lower
discount rate implies that a lower employment probability than the one
observed is consistent with income—maximization, while a higher discount rate
implies the opposite. In other words, if their discount rates are less than
41%, unemployed black youth are being too cautious and are choosing
reservation wages that would maximize income only if their chances of becoming
employed were lower than they are now. On the other hand, black youth are too
optimistic and choose reservation wages too high if their discount rates are
above 41%.
Of course, some caveats mentioned above must now be considered again
since they are likely to cause biases in estimates of employment probabilities
that are consistent with rational behavior. For instance, unemployed youth
living at home are likely to value their leisure time and other non—work
activities. Therefore, nonwage income is likely to understate the true
benefits of being unemployed, and the implied employment probability that is
consistent with utility—maximization will be even lower than that consistent
with income—maximization. If nonwage income from illegal sources is
substantially underreported here, the employment probability consistent with
maximization would be lower still. These factors thus imply that reservation
wages could be even higher than those observed without violating the
principles of rational maximization. However, these biases do not appear to
greatly change the results described here.189
Furtermore, several other factors appear to explain why rational
maximizing may really call for reseration wages that are as low or lower than
those observed. In particular, the uncertainties and risks associated with
sources of income such as illegal activities should cause them to be far less
attractive per dollar received than sources such as Unemployment Insurance,
which provide a safe and steady stream of benefits with little effort. This,
in turn, suggests that the nonwage income figures used in the calculat!ons may
actually overstate the benefits of being unemployed. The employment
probability implied by risk—adjusted maximization may then be higher than the
one which appears in Table 2, and the argument that reservation wages should
be even higher than they are is severely weakened. Furthermore, Equation (5)
suggests that any overestimation of potential wage offers will also lower the
employment probabilities that appear to be consistent with maximization. If,
in fact, subjective expectations by black youth of the wage offers which they
face are too high, a higher employment probability will be consistent with
true income maximization and lower reservation wages would be in order. In
this last case, however, the behavior of black youth would be "rational" for a
given set of expectations, even where the expectations themselves are not.
To sum up, the evidence indicates that reservation wages chosen by
unemployed young blacks may not be inconsistent with rational behavior in a
simple, income—maximizing search model. While various factors may cause
biases in estimates of employment probabilities consistent with maximization,
some are upward and others downward. Their net effect is unclear, but they
are unlikely to substantially change the basic result of consistency with
maximizing behavior.10
Moving on to the elasticities which are implied by income—maximization,
we find that reservation wages among unemployed black youth will be less
responsive to nonwage income and more responsive to offers under income—
maximizing search than will those of the group studied by Lancaster and
Chesher 19
The low elasticity with respect to nonwage Income Is somewhat troubling
here, given the importance attached to this Income in the previous discussion
of high reservation wages. However, these calculations are surprisingly
consistent with some econometrically estimated elasticities for this group
that. ranged in value from .02 to .07.20 This consistency of the job search
model's predictions with econometric evidence provides more support for the
notion that income—maximizing principles may accurately portray the behavior
of unemployed young blacks.
It is also noteworthy that the factors discussed above which may bias
calculations based on the simple search model (e.g., underreporting of nonwage
income, endogenelty ,etc.)will also bias econometric estimates of these
elasticities, and that the net effect of these biases is likely to be
downward.21 It is therefore quite possible that reservation wage elasticities
for black youth with respect to nonwage income are more substantial than those
calculated or estimated here. But the discrepancies in this case are caused
by measurement problems rather than the maximizing assumptions which underlie
the search model.
As for the elasticities of employment probabilities, these are
substantially different from the reservation wage elasticities presented in
Table 2. The reasons for these discrepancies are readily apparent. In order
to calculate these employment elasticities, some distribution function had to
be assumed for wage offers in order to obtain an estimate for the hazard
function. Following Lancaster and Chesher, I use the Pareto distribution for11
the sake of convenience and simplicity. The use of the Pareto distribution
here enables us to replace the hazard function with
1
rwhere a is the
a. w
standard deviation of wage offers; the value of this statistic can, in turn,
be inferred from the data on expected and reservation wages which are
available here.21 However, this replacing of the hazard function has the




From the expected and reservation wage data for young blacks, a is calculated
to be approximately .25 and the elasticity of employment probability with
respect to reservation wages approximately 4. This implied employment
elasticity is clearly larger than other estimates of these elasticities for
young blacks.23 This, in turn, causes the employment elasticities with
respect to nonwage income and offer arrivals to appear larger and smaller,
respectively, than would otherwise be the case. These problems appear to be
even more true for Lancaster and Chesher, for whomapproximately equals
10. But the difficulties in this case seem to be more a result of the
assumption of Pareto distributions for wage offers than of the job search
model on which these calculations are based. Once again, support for the
proposition that young blacks are behaving rationally is not undercut by the
evidence presented.12
III. Conclusion
In this paper I provide some evidence on the question of whether the
behavior of unemploy, young blacks, whose reservation wages are relatively
high and whose jobless spells are very lengthy, reflect rational maximizing
choices. To do this, I use a simple income—maximizing job search model to
imply employment probabilities and various elasticities which are compared to
those which are actually observed for young blacks.
The results show that, for reasonable discount rates, the employment
probabilities implied by income—maximization are consistent with those
observed for young blacks. The elasticities of reservation wages with respect
to nonwage Income that are implied by income—maximizing are also consistent
with those estimated econometrically for this group. This was true despite
the many assumptions embodied in this model whose validity for a sample of
low—income youth is highly questionable.
The evidence thus suggests that young blacks are making economically
reational choices by choosing high reservation wages and lengthy spells
without jobs. Given the availability of nonwage income from illegal
activities and other sources, and given the low potential wage offers which
they face, it appears to be in the interests of many young blacks to demand
high wages before accepting work. This is consistent with other research
evidence that shows young blacks responding to incentives and behaving
rationally in their labor market pursuits.24
It is, however important to interpret these results carefully. What is
rational or optimal from the private point of view is not necessarily so from
a social point of view; this is especially, true if the nonwage income on which
unemployed people rely represents a cost to society. Futhermore, the private
rationality of high reservation wages depends on wage offer distributions13
remaining unattractive relative to nonwage income. However, government
policies exist (e.g., education and training programs, Affirmative Action,
etc) which might change the attractiveness of the labor market which
unemployed people face and therefore might affect their behavior.25
Finally, it is Important to remember that offer probabilities as well as
wage offers affect employment probabilities. Even if the reservation wages of
young blacks declined to the minimum wage (or lower), low offer probabilities
may continue to reflect the severe demand side constraints which many
unemployed young blacks presumably face. A policy approach on black youth
unemployment must therefore consider many sources of low employment
probabilities if it is to be successful.14
Footnotes
1See Clark and Summers (1982), Eallen and Freeman (1984).
2See Hoizer (1984).
3See Lancaster and Chesher (1983).
4me exact wording of the question they use is,"Howmuch take home pay
would you expect to be able to earn in a new job?"
5Lancaster and Chesher evidence in favor of their interpretation of this
variable as a conditional rather than unconditional mean of the offer wage
distribution—i.e., that e =E(wlw >Wr) instead of e =E(w).Theevidence
consists of joint frequency distributions of e and r which show the former
to be greater than or equal to the latter for virtually every individual in
the sample.
6The Pareto distribution is chosen for computational convenience and
because it specifies a declining frequency of wages, which should be accurate
for most of the portion of the wage distribution above the reservation wage.
The effects of using a normal distribution instead (which would allow for
rising or declining frequency) are discussed as well.
7The city blocks chosen were those in which at least 70% of the
population was black and 30% of families had income below the poverty line in
the 1970 Census.
8There were concerns that the specific wording of the expected wage
question (i.e., the references to "best job" and "right now") made it
inappropriate for the job search context. However, responses to this question
were very comparable to those for the other question that asked about the job
which the individual is seeking. The decision to use the former variable here15
was based on its availability for a larger sample and also on the availability
of information on the perceived chance of obtaining this job, which is
described in the text below.
9Only 5% of those without jobs in the sample report receiving
Unemployment Insurance at the time of the survey. This is consistent with the
fact that over 40% of this group report no regular employment in the previous
year, while the rest report completed employment durations of approximately 13
weeks. For the latter figure see Ballen and Freeman op. cit., p. 11.
Presumably, a large fraction of the reported employment spells are part—time
orsummer jobs of former students.
good discussion of the potential reporting errors inthesedata and
howthey might affect estimated relationships with labor market outcomes can
be found in Viscus: (1984).
11Many of these figures are reported in Ballen and Freeman, op. cit.
calculating these elasticities, nonwage income is converted to an
hourly equivalent by assuming 40 hours per week and 4 weeks per month work.
1-30f those without work in the nonstudent sample, about 80% are in the
official labor force. The decision to includethe others as well is
consistent with the work of Clark and Summers op. cit., who find the
distinction between unemployed and out of the labor force to be arbitrary.
Calculations performed for those in the labor force suggest that the
qualitative results do not change when the sample is limited to this group.
14This is true since the expected duration of a spell of
unemployment E(D) =f- where is defined for a finite time unit.
15me mean wage previously received by this group was $3.98. Alternative
interpretations of the gap between currently expected and previously received
wages include adjustments for inflation, higher minimum wages, and human16
capital formation over time. This last factor could be important for recent
high school graduates whose previous earnings, are from summer or part—time
jobs.
16For those reporting illegally received income, the mean monthly income
attributable to this source is about $235. Thus the monthly nonwage income of
the sample excluding that from Illegal sources is about $71.
7See Viscusi, op. cit.
18For instance, if the total amount of money obtained by illegal
activities was double the amount reported, the implied would decline to
2.155 and the discount rate which would equate the probabilities would rise to
45.7%.
19meir reservation wage elasticities with respect to nonwage income and
offer arrivals were .135 and .107, respectively.
20See Hoizer (1983), Chapter 6. The elasticities are calculated from
equations of the form £fl(Wr)a + n(b) + y X, where the X included various
measures of actual or expected wages.
21y reporting errors in nonwage income, the independent variable, are
likely to result in downward biases in the estimated coefficients for that
variable. Futhermore, the presumed positive correlation of unobserved
personal quality with reservation wages and its negative correlation with
income from sources such as Illegal activities should cause another downward
bias for these estimates. The effects of income endogenity on estimated
elasticities are unclear.
22The Pareto distribution implies that, sinceis comparable to the
coefficient of variation for the wage offer distribution, e =w/(l—).See
Lancaster and Chesher, p. 1669.17
23Elasticities of duration of unemployment with respect to reservation
wages of young blacks, estimated using the National Longitudial Survey, range
from .6 to 1.4 in Hoizer (1984). These estimates are based on equations of
the form £n(D) = + Ln(w') + y X ,wherethe X represent variables that are
likely to affect offer probabilities and wage offers which individuals face.
While fairly substantial, these elasticities remain well below what is implied
by assuming the Pareto distribution.
24For instance, Viscusi op. cit. shows that the decision of young blacks
to participate in illegal activities is largely influenced by their
preceptions of risks and returns in legal and illegal pursuits. Ferguson and
Filer (1984) also find absenteeism on the job related to incentives created by
job characteristics (e.g., wage, status, and skill specificity) as predicted
by rational, maximizing behavior.
25Posltive effects of Affirmative Action programs on employment of blacks
has been found by Leongrd (1984). The effects of education and training
programs on earnings for black males and other groups is reviawed in Barocci
(1982).18
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